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Privacy, Emotional Distress, and
the Limits of Libel Law Reform
by Jonathan L. Entin*

Assessing a congressional tax reform proposal several years ago, a lead
ing expert warned: "The tax bar is the repository of the greatest ingenu
ity in America, and given the chance, those people will do you in."l This
warning serves as a useful reminder that the real world has a nasty habit
of frustrating even the most carefully crafted legal arrangements. s The
whole body of criminal law bears stark witness to the inability of formal
rules to eliminate antisocial conduct. Similarly, despite numerous judicial
decisions and civil rights statutes, large socioeconomic differentials be
tween blacks and whites persist. The moral of these observations is not
that efforts to reform the law are unavailing, but rather that single
minded focus upon one problem may obscure interrelationships with
other factors that must also be taken into account in order for legal re
form to succeed.
The subject of libel exemplifies this phenomenon. The law in this field
represents a complex effort to accommodate the competing societal inter
ests in protecting individual reputation and in preserving freedom of
• Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. Brown University (A.B.,
1969); Northwestern University (J.D., 1981). Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
The author thanks Melvyn Durchslag, Peter Junger, William Ketter, and William Mar
shall for their valuable suggestions and Gretchen McClurkin for her helpful research
assistance.
1. Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hear
ings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways &
Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1982) (testimony of Martin D. Ginsburg). Professor Gins
burg's warning was reprinted in bold-face type as a subhead line on the front page of the
Washington Post. Edsall, Firms Escaping Millions in Taxes, Wash. Post, June 1, 1982, at
AI. Not long afterward, T-shirts emblazoned with silkscreen reproductions of the newspaper
subhead mysteriously appeared at the Internal Revenue Service.
2. For an acclaimed discussion of the difficulty of achieving desired goals through
planned change, see Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,
1 AM. Soc. REV. 894 (1936).
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speech.3 Over the past generation, that law has been pervasively trans
formed and refined. Despite the doctrinal ferment, no one appears satis
fied with the result, least of all the press, which seemed to be the princi
pal beneficiary of the new legal rules! Consequently, suggestions for
reform, advanced primarily by those who believe that the media require
more stringent protection against libel suits than current law affords, now
abound.
The preceding discussion implies, however, that tinkering with defama
tion law, or eliminating the tort altogether, will not save the press from
those who believe that even the current legal regime is insufficiently hos
pitable to the claims of victims of journalistic irresponsibility. In particu
lar, it seems likely that further attempts to restrict the ability of plaintiffs
to recover for libel will encourage the filing of claims denominated as
false-light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
or both, because the courts have been slow to apply first amendment
principles to those torts. Yet the same considerations which have made it
more difficult for many plaintiffs to recover for libel ought to make it
equally difficulty for them to recover under theories of privacy and emo
tional distress.

1.

LIBEL

The Supreme Court ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 accord
ing to Alexander Meiklejohn, was "an occasion for dancing in the
3. The Supreme Court has explicitly balanced these interests in several important libel
cases. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Bldrs., Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-63
(1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-50 (1974) .
The Court recently has suggested that, in addition to protecting individual reputation,
states have a legitimate interest in protecting their citizens from falsehoods. That interest
may be sufficient to support at least some criminal libel statutes. Keeton v. Hustler Maga
zine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 & n.6 (1984) (dictum) .
4. This Article is concerned with the law of libel as it affects the press. Most of the
judicial decisions that will be considered involved media defendants. The Supreme Court
has not formally resolved whether the constitutional principles enunciated in libel cases
against the press apply equally to defamation claims against other types of defendants.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979). Indeed, the Court recently declined
to decide this question, although the parties had been directed to address the significance of
the media-nonmedia distinction in supplemental briefs. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.•
Greenmoss Bldrs., Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 753 (1985). Five members of the Court, in separate
opinions in that case, rejected the distinction. [d. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judg.
ment); id. at 781-84 & 782 n.6 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting) .
The wisdom, utility, and constitutionality of treating the press differently from other def·
amation defendants are beyond the scope of this Article. In any event, the resolution of
these issues does not affect the analysis that follows.
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) .
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streets."6 In one fell swoop, the Court transformed defamation from a rel
atively isolated backwater of the law of torts into a core element of con
stitutional law. 7 Of particular significance, the opinion implied a funda
mental rethinking of first amendment doctrine to suggest that the offense
of seditious libel-the imposition of legal sanctions for criticism of public
officials or government policy-was incompatible with the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech. 8
The predicted demise of seditious libel appeared closer to reality when
New York Times was extended soon afterward to criminal libel actions
brought by public officialsB and then to civil suits filed by candidates for
public office. 1o Moreover, the prospective end of virtually all important
libel actions seemed imminent when the Court applied the New York
Times rule to suits brought by public figures. I I
Of course, things were never so simple. From the outset, it was clear
that New York Times had not outlawed all libel actions, even by public
officials. The majority opinion expressly declined to go so far, holding
only that a public official could not prevail in an action for libel without
showing that the defendant had published a defamatory falsehood "with
6. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning 0/ the First
Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125.
7. See id. at 192. While defamation may have been a somewhat peripheral aspect of the
common law of torts, it was also an unusually complex one:
It contsin[ed) anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer ever has had a
kind word, and it [was) a curious compound of a strict liability imposed upon
innocent defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything found in the law, with a
blind and almost perverse refusal to compensate the plaintiff for real and very
serious harm.
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
111, at 771-72 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON) .
8. Kalven, supra note 6, at 204-10. The idea that the framers intended to abolish sedi
tious libel when they adopted the first amendment has generated a lively academic contro
versy. Compare Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18-30 (1941) (arguing that
the principal purposes of the first amendment included rejection of seditious libel) with L.
LEVY, THE EMERGENCE or A FREE PRESS 220-81 (1985) (arguing that the framers did not
mean to reject seditious libel). Nevertheless, the New York Times opinion suggests the un
constitutionality of seditious libel by its express repudiation of the Sedition Act, which ex
pired by its own terms in 1801. See 376 U.S. at 273-76.
9. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
10. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265 (1971). Earlier, the Court had held that New York Times also applied to at
least some nonelected public officials. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (supervisor of
county recreation facility).
11. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The extension of New York
Times to public figures has not escaped criticism. See, e.g., Lewis, New York Times v. Sulli
van Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central Meaning 0/ the First Amendment," 83
COLUM. L. REV. 603, 623-24 (1983); Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905
(1984).
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'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."12 Further, only three members
of the Court were willing to extend the actual-malice requirement to def·
amation actions filed by private-figure plaintiffs over statements involving
matters of public concern. IS Then, beginning with Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,14 the Court consistently adhered to a narrow definition of the class
of public figures to whom the stringent New York Times fault standard
applied.l~

The Gertz decision reflected the Court's ambivalence over the relation
ship between defamation and the first amendment. In one sense, that
case represented something of a retreat from New York Times because it
restricted the category of public figures who must prove actual malice in
order to recover damages for libel. On the other hand, Gertz for the first
time required private-figure libel plaintiffs to show some minimum level
of fault on the part of the defendant in order to recover actual damages. Ie
This repudiation of strict liability as a basis for defamation effectively
"revolutionize[dl the law of libel."17
Subsequent rulings underscored the judicial uncertainty in this area.
For example, the Court held that the requirement of a showing of fault as
a predicate for liability necessarily entitled plaintiffs to inquire into the
thought processes and editorial judgments of defendants.18 While this
holding was logically correct, it had the ironic effect of creating at least
marginal disincentives for aggressive inquiry into subjects of public im
portance, which was precisely the reason that the Court in New York
Times and Gertz had substituted constitutionally based fault standards
for the strict-liability rule that had prevailed at common law. There also
were mixed signals on the propriety of summary judg'm ent in libel litiga
tion. At first , the Court implied that the existence of actual malice was

12. 376 U.S. at 280.
13. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
14. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
15. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (person convicted of con
tempt of court for refusing to testify before grand jury investigating Soviet espionage in the
United States held to be a private figure) ; Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U_S. 111 (1979)
(scientist who was on staff of state hospital, served as adjunct professor at state university,
and had successfully solicited in excess of $500,000 in federal research grants held to be a
private figure) ; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (socially prominent plaintiff
involved in divorce case that had aroused great public interest held to be a private figure).
16. 418 U.S. at 347. Even private plaintiffs, however, were required to demonstrate ac
tual malice in order to recover punitive damages. ld. at 349-50. The apparent clarity of the
Gertz rules would prove to be somewhat illusory. See infra notes 22 & 74-79 and accompa
nying text.
17. 418 U.S. at 390 (White, J ., dissenting) .
18. Herbert v. Lado, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
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not an appropriate question for summary disposition. IS A decision last
term, however, suggested that trial judges should be more willing to dis
pose of libel cases before triaPO Finally, the Court has held that appellate
review of libel judgments must be unusually rigorous to assure that the
requisite degree of fault has been shown/u but also, in apparent contra
diction of Gertz, that the states may continue to impose strict liability for
defamatory statements about private figures when the subject at issue is
not a matter of public concern. 22
In short, during the 1960s, the Supreme Court strongly emphasized the
importance of promoting free expression. Since the mid-1970s, however,
the Court has shown greater concern for the harms that may result from
defamatory statements. These developments have generated widespread
uncertainty and confusion. At present, libel litigation tends to focus more
upon the fault of the defendant than upon the falsity of the statement at
issue. 13 Regardless of the outcome, such litigation has tended to become
costlier to conduct and take longer to complete than ever before.2~
At the same time, a more aggressively individualistic social and cultural
ethos has emerged. U Transformations in the structure and role of the
news media, along with some much-publicized journalistic derelictions,
have helped to fan public distrust of the press. 2S These developments, in
turn, have encouraged expensive and potentially ruinous lawsuits against
publishers and broadcasters.27 Further, jurors too often seem unable or
19. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) .
20. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
21. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). In two other cases decided
a few weeks before Bose, the Court rejected arguments that the first amendment requires
special personal-jurisdiction rules in defamation suits. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91
(1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
22. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). For further
discussion of this decision, see infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
23. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Press: Setting the Record Straight-Part 3: Libel Law
and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 215, 229-30
(1985).
24. See, e.g., R. SMOLLA. SUING THE PRESS 9 (1986); Lewis, supra note 11, at 609-12.
25. Professor Smolla has arrestingly described this development as "the general thinning
of the American skin." R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 16. See generally id. at 15; Smolla, Let
the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
14-21 (1983).
26. R. SMOLLA, supra, note 24, at 15; Smolla, supra note 25, at 36-47.
27. One widely noted example concerned a $9.2 million judgment that forced a small
newspaper into bankruptcy. See Green v. Alton Tel. Printing Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 755, 438
N.E.2d 203 (1982). Others include retired General William Westmoreland's unsuccessful
suit for $120 million against CBS and former Senator Paul Laxalt's pending claim for $250
million against the Sacramento Bee. For a detailed, though controversial, chronicle of the
Westmoreland litigation, see R. ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD (1986). The Laxalt case is still
in discovery. See Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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unwilling to follow the complex legal rules that apply to libel suits.28 In
addition, increasingly large jury verdicts in defamation cases seem to con·
firm fears of widespread public hostility toward the media.28 Indeed,
there is reason to suspect that this lack of sympathy for the press extends
to some segments of the judiciary. so
The unsettled state of libel law has prompted the ultimate heresy: sug·
gestions that New York Times be reconsidered. 31 While hardly anyone
has advocated a complete return to the common law regime which that
landmark ruling supplanted,31 various reforms designed to protect the
press against the uncertainty and expense of defamation litigation have
been proposed. Possible changes include forbidding any form of recovery
Entirely apart from actual or potential damage awards, the expense of libel litigation is
staggering. The cost of the Westmoreland case alone is estimated at up to $10 million, and
CBS has spent nearly $4 million defending itself against a suit by ex-Colonel Anthony Her
bert which is now in its fifteenth year. R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 75.
28. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 13 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2377, 2409 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane)
(Ruth B. Ginsburg, J., concurring); R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 194-95. For a particularly
useful illustration of this phenomenon, see Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington
Post Libel Trial, AM. LAW., Nov. 1982, at 1.
29. R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 13; Smolla, supra note 25, at 4·7. The propensity of
juries to return large verdicts may account for the willingness of many plaintiffs to file suit
even though the vast majority of libel suits result in judgment for the defendant. Bezanson,
supra note 23, at 229; Smolla, supra note 25, at 7.
30. Perhaps the most widely noted example of this phenomenon arose in the libel suit of
the president of Mobil Oil Corporation concerning a series of articles published by the
Washington Post. The majority of the panel that heard the appeal in that case emphasized
the newspaper's policy of seeking high-impact stories as evidence of actual malice. Tavou
lareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 117-21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd on reh'g en bane, 13 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 2377 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The panel majority adhered to that position in the subsequent
proceedings in the court of appeals. See 763 F.2d 1472, 1478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (denying
petition for rehearing); 13 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2432-33 (MacKinnon, J ., dissenting from
reversal of panel's decision). See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Bldrs., Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 764 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting reputed journalistic
aphorism that "too much checking on the facts has ruined many a good news story");
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (remarking that
New York Times "fulsomely assure[s)" protection to the press), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).
31. Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2927, 2927-28
(1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at
767·72 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
32. One significant exception is William M. Bulger, president of the Massachusetts State
Senate, who has attacked New York Times as a "pernicious" decision. Bulger, The New
Terrorism: Historical Development of Press Power in America, lecture delivered to the Mu
sachusetts Historical Society, Sept. 19, 1986 (copy on file with Mercer Law Review).
In addition, a prominent academic commentator recently has suggested that the common
law of libel, with some adjustments, would be more protective of the preas than the system
that has evolved in the wake of the Times case. Epstein, Was New York Times Wrong?,53
U. CHI. L. REv. 782, 801-17 (1986).
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for criticism of governmental officials concerning matters of public pol
icy,33 limiting compensatory damages to actual pecuniary loss,34 eliminat
ing punitive damages altogether,30 assessing the attorney's fees incurred
by the prevailing party against the loser,38 and substituting the remedy of
retraction for that of damages in at least certain types of libel actions. 37
33. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 11, at 620-21.
34. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 771-72 (White, J., concurring in the judg
ment); Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARV L. REV. 747, 756
73 (1984); Lewis, supra note 11, at 615. Cf, R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 242 (proposing
limitation of compensatory damages to actual pecuniary loss when defendant issues "a
prompt and complete retraction in a manner calculated to reach the same audience [that
saw, heard, or read the defamatory statement] with the same impact [as that statement)";
advocating in other cases a restriction of general damages not supported by evidence of
actual pecuniary loss to a fixed ceiling).
35. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 771-72 (White, J., concurring in the judg
ment); R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 241-42; Lewis, supra note 11, at 616-17. The Supreme
Court has indicated its unease over the propriety of punitive damages in libel cases by
describing such awards as "private fines levied by civil juries." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Some states prohibit the award of punitive damages in libel ac
tions on the ground that such awards are inconsistent with constitutional protections for the
press. Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 860, 330 N.E.2d 161, 169
(1975); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 117-19,593 P.2d 777, 788-89 (1979); Taskett v. King
Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 447, 546 P.2d 81, 86 (1976). For a suggestion that cur
rent standards for the award of punitive damages insufficiently protect libel defendants, see
Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 847, 855-61 (1985). More gener
ally, the prospect of windfall recoveries has led a few states to prohibit or limit severely the
availability of punitive damages in all tort actions. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 2, at
9 & n.20; Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 477 n.51.
36. See, e.g., R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 239-41.
37. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 292-99 (3d ed.
1986); R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 241, 242. The Iowa Libel Research Project, which is
discussed elsewhere in this symposium, also proposes a new cause of action to "set the rec
ord straight." Under this approach, a court would determine only the truth or falsity of the
statement in question; the fault of the defendant in publishing a defamatory falsehood
would be irrelevant.
The constitutionality of any form of compelled retraction or right of reply in defamation
cases is unclear. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(invalidating state law conferring mandatory right of reply upon political candidates who
are attacked by newspapers) with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(upholding administrative regulation providing right of reply to persons attacked in broad
casts concerning matters of public importance). Neither of these cases concerned defama
tory statements, however. Several states have enacted libel statutes that restrict the availa
bility of damages but do not eliminate liability if a timely and adequate retraction is
published. See generally M. FRANKLIN, supra, at 151-53. The Supreme Court has never con
sidered the merits of any of these laws and has expressly declined to intimate any view on
the constitutionality of mandatory retraction as a remedy in libel cases. See Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565 n.4 (1986); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258-59
(Brennan, J ., joined by Rehnquist, J ., concurring); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
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The wisdom of these proposals has stimulated growing debate. 38 But,
even if any of these changes were desirable and worked exactly as ex
pected-matters that are beyond the scope of this Article-the press
would not necessarily find its position improved. These reforms address
only the rules and procedures that apply to defamation claims. Increas
ingly, however, plaintiffs have relied upon other theories as predicates for
redress against the media. Failure to consider this development could vi
tiate any added protection that the media would enjoy as a result of
changes in the law of libel.
II.

PRIVACY

One of the principal alternative grounds for litigation against the press
has been invasion of privacy. Although originally conceived as a means
for affording relief against what was viewed as scandalous newspaper gos
sip about the affairs of the socially prominent,89 the privacy tort has come
to be seen as encompassing four distinct violations of a plaintiff's inter
ests: (1) unreasonable publicity that places one in a false light;·o (2) un
reasonable publicity that discloses embarrassing private facts;·) (3) unrea
368-69 n.3 (1974) (Brennan, J ., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 243 (suggesting that absolute immunity for
criticism of public officials will deter qualified persons from government service); LeBel,
Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779
(1984) (rejecting limitation of compensatory damages to actual pecuniary loss as insuffi
ciently protective of victims of defamation).
39. The tort was, for all practical purposes, invented in a celebrated law review article
coauthored by Louis Brandeis. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890). On the background to this article, see Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
383, 383-84 (1960).
40. Prosser, supra note 39, at 398-401. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E
(1976):
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would
be placed.
For further discussion of the standard contained in paragraph (b) of this section, see infra
notes 60-82 and accompanying text.
41. Prosser, supra note 39, at 392-98. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
(1976):
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
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sonable intrusion upon seclusion;42 and (4) improper appropriation of the
name or likeness of another.· s
Taken together, the four varieties of invasion of privacy significantly
expand both the number of legal theories available to those aggrieved by
media reporting and the range of stories that might give rise to litigation.
Three of these varieties-embarrassing-facts, intrusion, and appropria
tion-permit recovery for truthful publications. This significantly broad
ens the risk to the press because these doctrines could require the media
to defend against, and perhaps to pay damages for, complaints over en
tirely correct reports. In contrast, libelous statements must, by definition,
be false!·
The other species of privacy-false-light-bears a striking resemblance
to libel. Under the false-light approach, any erroneous statement that
portrays someone in a highly offensive way could form the predicate for a
lawsuit, even if the statement is not defamatory"~ This, in turn, poses
several new dangers to the press. For example, by broadening the defini
tion of actionable false statements, this doctrine could facilitate a sub
stantially larger number of suits against the media, many of the nuisance
variety!· Even if the false-light theory were limited to defamatory state
ments, however, the press still would face significant additional risks. Al
lowing plaintiffs to sue over defamatory statements under the alternative
theories of libel and false-light privacy could permit double recovery in
some cases. Moreover, permitting plaintiffs to denominate a defamation
claim as one for false-light privacy could lead to the circumvention of first
amendment protections that the Supreme Court has established in its li
bel jurisprudence.

(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Only this type of invasion of privacy was contemplated by the inventors of the tort.
Kalven. Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326. 330 (1966).
42. Prosser. supra note 39. at 389-92. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
(1976):
One who intentionally intrudes. physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or se
clusion of another or his private affairs or concerns. is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy. if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.
43. Prosser, supra note 39, at 401-07. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C
(1976):
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.
44. See Kalven. supra note 41. at 333.
45. See, e.g., Machleder v. Diaz. SOl F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1294 (1987); Rinsley v. Brandt. 700 F.2d 1304. 1307 (10th Cir. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652E comments a-b, illustrations 3-5 (1976).
46. See Kalven, supra note 41. at 338-40; Prosser, supra note 39, at 401..

844

MERCER LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

Before we consider these issues in greater detail, it would be useful to
note an important analytical relationship between some privacy theories
and the law of defamation. Many grievances against the press could be
characterized as either defamation or invasion of privacy; some situations
could give rise not only to claims for libel, but also to several different
privacy counts. A concrete example will clarify the point:
A national magazine prints a photograph of a famous cinematic lead
ing man on its cover to call attention to a supposedly exclusive story
about the actor's romantic adventures. The story suggests that, following
a heated argument with his long-time female companion, the actor spent
two torrid weeks with a younger woman at a ski resort; now, having made
amends with the first woman, he finds himself torn between the two, who
are themselves fiercely competing for his affections}?

In response, the actor might well sue the magazine for libel. In order to
succeed on his defamation claim, however, he would have to establish two
things: (1) that all or part of the story was false, and (2) that the maga
zine acted with the requisite degree of fault. Proving falsity in this in
stance might not be too difficult. The fault issue could well be more chal·
lenging, though. As a successful movie star, the plaintiff almost certainly
would be regarded as a public figure. That, in turn, would require that he
show the existence of actual malice on the part of the magazine to prevail.
Even if the actor surmounted these hurdles, he might obtain a disap
pointingly small recovery since the false statements about his romantic
affairs might not harm his reputation. After all, the suggestion that a
prominent leading man finds himself the object of the passionate desires
of two women is unlikely to detract from his public image.
The actor therefore might seek to avoid the necessity of proving fault
by relying upon privacy theories. Assuming the falsity of at least some
particulars of the story, he could seek damages for a false-light invasion
of privacy. The essence of this claim would be that the magazine had
portrayed him in an inaccurate and highly offensive, but not defamatory,
fashion. Further, the actor also could assert that the magazine had appro
priated his name and photograph for its own commercial advantage. In
substance, he would contend that the magazine published an inaccurate
and unauthorized story in order to enhance its sales and profits, thereby
unjustly enriching itself at his expense. Alternatively, if the story were
true in every detail, the actor could argue that entirely accurate discus
sion of his romantic and sexual affairs was not of legitimate public coo·
47. The example is adapted from the facts of Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 149 Cal. App. 3d
409,414-15, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344-45 (1983). For a somewhat different review of that case,
see Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery From the Press-An Extended
Comment on "The Anderson Solution, " 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 812-14 (1984).
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cern. Here he could maintain that the story improperly disclosed purely
private, and possibly embarrassing, facts about his personal life.
While it is possible to conceive other hypothetical examples involving
all four types of invasion of privacy,48 the two most closely analogous to
defamation are the embarrassing-facts and false-light varieties.·· For pre
sent purposes, however, false-light claims pose the greatest obstacle to the
success of legal changes designed to protect the press from a widely per
ceived upsurge in libel claims. This is so because the statement giving rise
to a false-light suit is incorrect, whereas the predicate for embarrassing
.facts litigation is a wholly accurate report.&O
As noted earlier, two different categories of untrue statements could
give rise to false-light claims. For instance, many erroneous but non
libelous statements are actionable under the false-light theory. From the
perspective of an editor or publisher, this raises the specter of a lawsuit
over every inaccuracy that finds its way into print.
It may well be that press concern over the prospect of vast numbers of
nuisance suits under the false-light rubric is considerably exaggerated. In
order to prevail in such a case, the plaintiff must show that the false light
resulting from even a nondefamatory, but nonetheless incorrect, state
ment would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. &1 Therefore, minor
or unimportant factual mistakes that do not reflect adversely upon the
plaintiff are not actionable. U On the other hand, to say that this press
48. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 39, at 408 n.199 (defendant breaks into plaintiff's
home, steals an intimate photograph of the plaintiff, and later publishes the picture in an
advertisement containing false statements about the plaintiff).
49. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, ll20 (1962).
One leading commentator contended that the analogy between false-light and defamation
is incorrect. According to this view, false-light is more closely related to embarrassing-facts
privacy. In either situation, the plaintiff claims injury not to reputation, as in libel, but
rather to peace of mind. Whether the statement at issue is true or false, the resulting injury
cannot be cured by more speech. Therefore, such statements should not come within the
protection of the first amendment. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935,
961-64 (1968). Even this commentator recognized, however, that some claims could be
brought under both false-light and defamation theories. He would have applied the fault
principles used in libel cases to such claims so as to prevent circumvention of those princi
ples through artful pleading. [d. at 964-65. For further discussion of the grounds for ac
cepting the analogy between false-light and libel suggested in the text and for rejecting
Professor Nimmer's position, see infra notes 73 & 80-82 and accompanying text.
50. For this reason, the discussion in the text is confined to false-light privacy claims.
For a brief consideration of issues relating to embarrassing-facts complaints, see infra note
70.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
52. See, e.g., Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 484-85, 68
N.Y.S.2d 779, 783-84 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 272 A.D. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432, appeal denied, 272
A.D. 794, 71 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1947) .
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concern may be exaggerated is not to say that it is unfounded. The diffi
culty of winning libel suits does not seem to have discouraged aggrieved
plaintiffs from filing claims. 18 There is no logical reason to suppose that
stringent rules limiting the prospects for recovery will, by themselves,
more effectively deter false-light litigation.
Other incorrect reports could elicit claims for both defamation and
false-light invasion of privacy.14 The threat to the press in such situations
would be twofold. First, the media could face the prospect of double re
covery by plaintiffs. Second, unless constitutional rules of the sort that
apply in libel actions were also to govern false-light claims, some plain
tiffs, such as the actor in the earlier example, might recover for invasion
of privacy even though the first amendment precluded them from recov
ering for defamation.
The risk of double recovery is enhanced by the uncertainty over pre
cisely what interest the false-light privacy tort serves. Some authorities
believe that this theory of privacy, like the law of libel, protects against
harm to reputation. II Those following this approach focus upon the likely
reaction of third persons to the objectionable communication. Ie Others
suggest that the goal of false-light, like other privacy claims, is to protect
against the mental distress attendant upon unwanted and inappropriate
public exposure.17 Adherents to this view thus focus upon the response of
the victim of the controversial message rather than upon the reaction of
the potential recipient. If false-light claims arise from injury to reputa
tion, plaintiffs might be able to obtain duplicative damages under sepa
rate counts denominated 'libel' and 'invasion of privacy.' If, by contrast,
such claims arise from harm to the psyche occasioned by untrue state
ments, juries still may have difficulty disentangling those injuries which
are compensable from those which are not. Hence, the likelihood of over
lapping compensation awards may be reduced, but it might not be
eliminated.
Analytically, the issue of double recovery in false-light actions does not
present novel questions. Current libel law already allows prevailing plain
tiffs to obtain compensation for both the harm to their good name and
53. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
54. Examples include the use of the name of a real person on sexually suggestive letters
to advertise a movie, Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577
(1942), and the publication of a cab driver's photograph to illustrate an article on dishonest
practices in the local taxi business, Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C.
1948). See Wade, supra note 49, at 1099-100.
55. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 117, at 864; Wade, supra note 49, at
1094, 1120-22.
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 comment d (1976).
57. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 n.9 (1967); Van Alstyne, supra note 47,
at 811.
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their own mental distress resulting from the publication of defamatory
statements. 68 Thus, whether false-light actions protect reputation or pro
mote inner peace, permitting aggrieved parties to pursue claims for both
defamation and false-light invasion of privacy appears not to pose signifi
cant additional danger of duplicative compensation awards. Indeed, there
is reason to believe that courts can prevent double recovery in at least
some cases brought under both theories. 611
More troubling is the possibility that recognition of this type of privacy
claim could allow plaintiffs to circumvent the constitutional limitations
that apply to libel actions. The Supreme Court has decided only two
false-light privacy cases, neither of which directly addressed this problem.
Both decisions, however, applied the New York Times actual-malice stan
dard to the false-light claims at issue. Nevertheless, factual and proce
dural peculiarities in each case render uncertain the extent to which this
standard might apply in other false-light situations.
The first of these cases was Time, Inc. v. Hill.eo This litigation resulted
from a magazine article about a play that was inspired by an incident in
which the Hill family had been held hostage by three escaped prisoners.
The play did not use the family's name and contained a number of scenes
that had not actually occurred. The article, however, did identify the
Hills and incorrectly described the playas a reenactment of their harrow
ing encounter. A judgment in favor of the family was set aside because
the jury had not been instructed that liability must be premised upon a
finding of deliberate or reckless falsehood on the part of the magazine!11
Several factors raise doubt as to the breadth of the holding in Hill.
First, this was not a true false-light case. The plaintiffs' grievance was less
the relatively minor inaccuracies in the article than the unwanted public
ity about a frightening experience that they had sought to put behind
them. 83 They brought their claim as a false-light case only because the
state statute under which they sued precluded recovery for a fully accu
58. The Supreme Court has defined the actual injury for which a successful libel plaintiff
may be compensated to include "personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
59. See, e.g., Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 250-52 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 469 U.S. 883
(1984); Wade, supra note 49, at 1107; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E
comment b (1976).
60. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
61. [d. at 391-97.
62. See Ashdown, Media Reporting and Privacy Claims-Decline in Constitutional
Protection for the Press, 66 Ky. L.J. 759, 764 n.30 (1978); Hill, Defamation and Privacy
Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1271, 1273 (1976); Kalven, The Rea
sonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267,
272-73.

848

MERCER LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

rate account. 68
Second, the Court's reasoning rested upon the premise that the press
has a constitutional privilege to report on any newsworthy subject. e• In
the defamation context, however, that premise never attracted majority
support among the justicesU and was expressly rejected in Gertz.ee In
deed, that aspect of Gertz may have implicitly called into question the
continuing vitality of Hill.67
The Court's only other false-light decision, Cantrell v. Forest City Pub
lishing CO.,68 failed to resolve those doubts. This case concerned a follow
up newspaper story on the effects of a bridge collapse that resulted in
several dozen deaths. Members of the family of one of the victims com
plained that the article contained numerous inaccuracies depicting them
as impoverished, despondent, and slovenly. The most egregious of these
was an account of an interview with Mrs. Cantrell that never took place. e•
Because the parties agreed that the New York Times actual-malice stan
dard should govern and the record contained ample evidence that the ar
ticle contained knowing falsehoods about the plaintiffs, the Court upheld
a judgment in their favor but did not determine whether the standard
announced in Hill was constitutionally required. 70
Despite the ambiguity of these decisions, they do permit a few general
observations about the appropriate standard in false-light privacy cases.
First, it is generally agreed, even by critics of the adoption of the actual
malice test in Hill, that the first amendment principles that apply to libel
should govern false-light claims arising from statements that are also de
63. Hill, supra note 62, at 1271; Kalven, supra note 62, at 273, 280. The Court recog·
nized this peculiarity of the case and actually ordered reargument on the issue of whether
the statute in question (currently codified at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1976 & Supp. 1987» permitted recovery for truthful reports of newsworthy matters. See 385
U.S. at 381-86 & 384 n.9.
64. 385 U.S. at 387-91.
65. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
66. 418 U.S. at 345-46. The newsworthiness criterion appears to have been resuscitated,
at least to some extent, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Bldrs., Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985). See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 498 n.2 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment d (1977); Ashdown, supra
note 62, at 781.
68. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
69. Id. at 248.
70. Id. at 250-53.
The Supreme Court has decided only one case raising what might be termed an embar·
rassing-facts privacy claim. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-97 (1975),
the Court held that no cause of action would lie for the accurate publication of the name of
a rape victim when the media obtained the information from public judicial records. For
criticism of that decision, see Hill, supra note 62, at 1264-68.
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famatory in order to prevent circumvention of minimum constitutional
safeguards for expression. 71
Second, there is reason to suspect that the Court will impose upon
false-light claims the same rules that govern in defamation actions,
whether the statement giving rise to the litigation is libelous or not. This
suspicion arises from dictum in Cantrell implying that a showing of ac
tual malice might not be required as a predicate for liability in all false
light cases.72 Such an approach would recognize the substantial practical
overlap between libel and false-light cases, and would reduce the likeli
hood of juror confusion in applying different legal standards to identical
or functionally similar claims.'s
Applying the defamation standards to all false-light cases would have
the virtue of conceptual symmetry. The seeming attractiveness of this ap
proach might be considerably exaggerated, however, as a result of the re
cent decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.'·
That decision revived the 'public concern' test, which apparently had
been repudiated in Gertz.7~ Under the analysis of Dun & Bradstreet, it
becomes necessary to focus not only upon the status of the plain
tiff-public official, public figure, or private figure-but also upon the na
ture of the issue-of public or private concern-in order to determine the
appropriate standard of fault needed to support a finding of liability.7s
Imposing the Dun & Bradstreet defamation logic upon false-light cases
would leave intact the actual-malice requirement for public officials and
at least those public figures who play significant roles in the debate over
public policy. The Supreme Court has suggested that there are few, if
any, matters about such persons that are of absolutely no relevance to the
public. 77 It is possible that a somewhat lower criterion might emerge for
71. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 49, at 964-65. Cf- Hart v. E.P. Dutton & Co., 197 Misc.
274, 283, 93 N.Y.S.2d 871, 880 (Sup. Ct.) (refusing to recognize novel cause of action by
plaintiff whose claim for libel was time-barred because recognition "would impose new and
unnecessary hazards upon publishers" contrary to constitutional protection for press), aff'd
mem., 277 A.D. 935,98 N.Y.S.2d 773, appeal denied, 277 A.D. 962, 99 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1949).
72. In Cantrell, the Court observed:
[T]his case presents no occasion to consider whether a State may constitutionally
apply a more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of false
ststements injurious to a private individual under a false-light theory of invasion
of privacy, or whether the constitutional standard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill
applies to all false-light cases. Cf. Gertz . . . .
419 U.S. at 250-51.
73. Hill, supra note 62, at 1274.
74. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
75. Id. at 756-61; cf. 418 U.S. at 343-46.
76. 472 U.S. at 755-61.
77. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300-01 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co.
v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,273-76,277 (1971). Both of these cases concerned candidates for elec
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those public figures not involved in political debate, although the Court
has never indicated much interest in developing one.?8
With respect to private figures, the reasoning of Dun & Bradstreet
would apply the Gertz principles only to false-light actions relating to
matters of public concern. In this category of cases, the plaintiff would
have to show that the defendant was at least negligent in order to prevail.
If the false statement about a private figure did not relate to a matter of
public concern, then presumably the defendant could be held strictly lia
ble. This latter conclusion seems to accord with traditional privacy
rules.?9
The foregoing discussion assumes that the Supreme Court will adjust
the fault standard in false-light privacy cases to be consistent with that
applicable in libel suits filed by plaintiffs of the same status over issues of
the same degree of public concern. However accurate such an assumption
may be, strong constitutional and policy arguments exist for retaining the
actual-malice requirement in all false-light cases. That requirement, ini
tially formulated in the defamation context, recognizes the inevitability of
factual mistakes in free-wheeling debate but seeks to provide latitude for
some of those errors in the interest of promoting first amendment
rights. 80
The reasons for continuing to apply this requirement to false-light
tive office, but the reasoning of those decisions undoubtedly applies more broadly. After all,
the extension of the New York Times actual malice standard to public figures was based in
significant part upon the perceived inability to distinguish between public officials and nom·
inally private citizens who in fact have an important influence on the discussion, adoption,
and implementation of policy matters. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163·
64 (1967) (Warren, C.J ., concurring in the result).
78. One possibility would be gross negligence. See Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 155
(opinion of Harlan, J.) ("highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible pub·
lishers"); but see Daniels, Public Figures Revisited, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 957, 959·62
(1984) (arguing that such an objective standard is "unworkable and ha[s) no foundation in
the first amendment").
79. The inventors of the privacy tort recognized a privilege for the press to publish
"matter which is of public or general interest." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 214.
That privilege has been consistently approved ever since. See Kalven, supra note 41, at 336.
It therefore follows that statements-whether true or false-which do not address matters
of legitimate public concern are not privileged. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652D comments d, g, h (1976); Nimmer, supra note 49, at 960-62.
The most difficult aspect of this issue is to define newsworthiness with sufficient precision
to make the contours of the privilege intelligible. The Court in Gertl rejected a "general or
public interest" test as unmanageable. 418 U.S. at 346. The concern that the judiciary can·
not develop consistent or unprincipled standards of the newsworthy appears well-founded.
See Kalven, supra note 62, at 283-84; Prosser, supra note 39, at 412-14; see also Dun &
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See, e g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
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claims stem from the relationship between these claims and those for def
amation. Many false-light cases concern nondefamatory statements,
which by definition are less harmful to the plaintiff than those that are
libelous. 81 It would be anomalous to make recovery easier for less serious
injuries, since that would encourage precisely that self-censorship which
the actual-malice standard was intended to prevent. 82 As for those situa
tions involving libelous statements, any plaintiff entitled to a lower fault
burden presumably will prevail on the defamation claim. Since such per
sons are entitled to full compensation for their actual injuries regardless
of how they denominate their claims, these persons can be made whole
without relying upon a false-light theory.
Even if arguments of this sort were to prevail, and the retention of the
actual-malice requirement established by Hill really discouraged actions
for false-light invasion of privacy, the press still would face significant
threats from a new quarter. Disgruntled plaintiffs recently have begun to
sue the media for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To date, the
Supreme Court has not considered a case presenting this issue. Accord
ingly, the relevance of the first amendment to emotional-distress suits re
mains ambiguous. Plaintiffs' initial success in these cases suggests that
more will be filed. It is to this subject that we now turn.
III.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Until relatively recently, courts were reluctant to recognize an indepen
dent cause of action for the infliction of emotional distress. Judicial hos
tility stemmed primarily from concern that psychic harms were idiosyn
cratic, intangible, and ephemeral. Accordingly, recognition of such claims
would open the door to a multitude of trivial, if not fraudulent, lawsuits."
The predominant view was that, with respect to many of the slings and
arrows of daily affairs, "a certain toughening of the mental hide is a bet
ter protection than the law could ever be."8. Exceptions were made for
flagrant and intentional misconduct resulting in emotional harm8& and for
negligence causing psychological injury under certain limited conditions. 88
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment d (1977).
82. It is not clear how much self-censorship the Court meant to discourage in New York
Times, nor is it obvious that all forms of self-censorship are socially undesirable. Anderson,
Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 429 (1975); Sunstein, Hard Defama
tion Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 891, 895 (1984).
83. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 12, at 54-56.
84. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033, 1035 (1936).
85. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 12, at 57-65.
86. See generally id., § 54, at 361-67. Traditionally, the plaintiff in a negligence action
could not recover for mental disturbance unaccompanied by immediate physical injury.
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Today, most jurisdictions recognize the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. This tort provides relief to victims of extreme and
outrageous conduct that leads to severe psychic injury.87 Not surprisingly,
plaintiffs have begun to invoke this theory against the press, typically in
conjunction with claims for libel and invasion of privacy.Bs

•

Emotional distress was compensable if there had been some impact, however slight, upon
the person of the plaintiff. Bystanders have been allowed to recover for serious and foresee 
able psychic harm to third parties, at least where the plaintiff is within the 'zone of danger';
some cases have gone further and allowed bystanders to recover if they personally observe
the accident and are closely enough related to the injured third party.
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1963):
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo
tional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to
liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the
time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results
in bodily harm .
In addition, several courts have permitted recovery under a negligence rubric for the in
fliction of serious mental disturbance. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 54,
at 364-67; Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging
from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982).
88. Drechsel, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: N ew Tort Liability for Mass
Media, 89 DICK. L. REV. 339, 346 (1985) [hereinafter Intentional Infliction].
In addition to intentional infliction of emotional distress, several recent cases have consid
ered claims that press negligence has caused serious physical or psychic injury. Most of
these have concerned incidents in which someone has imitated activity depicted in the me
dia. These 'imitation' cases generally have failed because plaintiffs have not demonstrated
that the defendant incited the behavior giving rise to the claim. In disposing of these claims,
courts have emphasized the deleterious effect on first amendment values that would result
from imposing liability in the absence of a showing of incitement. See, e.g., Olivia N. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 489, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (1981), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982); Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 405
06, 276 S.E.2d 580, 583 (1981); DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1041
(R.1. 1982).
Other cases have concerned claims that media negligence resulted in the infliction of emo
tional distress. One particularly noteworthy example arose from a newspaper's publication
of the name and address of a kidnapping victim while her assailant was still at large, follow
ing which the assailant terrorized her on several occasions. The decision holding that the
victim had stated a cause of action against the newspaper, while at"least arguably correct,
accorded very little weight to first amendment values and failed almost completely to ad
dress the relevant competing interests implicated in the controversy. See Hyde v. City of
Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
Detailed consideration of such negligence cases is beyond the scope of this Article. For
further discussion of this subject, see Drechsel, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
New Tort Problem for the Mass Media, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 889 (1985); Linder, When
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Suits against the media alleging intentional infliction of emotional dis
tress are a distinctly contemporary phenomenon. There have been only a
few reported decisions concerning such claims, and the press has pre
vailed in most of them. 88 Significantly, however, most of these cases have
been filed within the last few years. eo Moreover, the recent appellate rul
ing in Falwell v. Flynt,81 upholding a large damage award for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in a highly publicized suit, promises to en
courage even more such litigation unless it is overturned by the Supreme
Court. For that reason, the Falwell case warrants detailed consideration.
The suit arose over an advertising parody involving the Reverend Jerry
Falwell, a prominent evangelist and political commentator, in Hustler, a
controversial magazine published by Larry Flynt. The parody in question
satirized a series of double-entendre advertisements touting the "first
time" that various celebrities drank a particular liqueur. In the Hustler
version, Falwell purportedly describes his first sexual experience as an in
cestuous affair with his mother, and effectively admits to being a hypo
crite and a drunkard. A disclaimer in small print appeared at the bottom
of the page warning that this was an "ad parody-not to be taken
seriously. "82
The evangelist sued for libel and intentional infliction of emotional dis
tress. 8S The jury rejected the libel claim, explaining that no reasonable
person would believe that the parody was true, but returned a verdict of
$200,000 in favor of Falwell on the emotional-distress count." The court
of appeals affirmed the award.
The Falwell decision seems wrong both factually and legally. As to the
Names Are Not News, They're Negligence: Media Liability for Personal Injuries Resulting
from the Publication of Accurate Information, 52 UMKC L. REv. 421 (1984); Mead, Suing
Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASH
BURN L.J . 24 (1983).
89. Intentional Infliction, supra note 88, at 346-47. The pattern of results in these
cases-plaintiffs generally have fared much better at the trial level than on appeal-closely
resembles that in libel actions. See, e.g., Franklin, Suing the Media for Libel: A Litigation
Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J . 795; Smolla, supra note 25, at 4-7.
90. Over 80 percent of the decisions analyzed in one recent study-29 of 35-were issued
between 1978 and 1985. Intentional Infliction, supra note 88, at 346.
91. 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. granted sub nom. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987).
92. 797 F.2d at 1272; see a/so Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d
1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 1986). This item was listed in the magazine's table of contents under
the heading, "Fiction: Ad and Personality Parody."
93. Falwell also sought damages under a Virginia statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40
(1984), for unlawful appropriation of his name and likeness. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's dismissal of this invasion of privacy claim. 797 F.2d at 1278.
94. 797 F.2d at 1273. The award included $100,000 in compensatory and $100,000 in
punitive damages.

,
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former, the evidence that Falwell had suffered severe emotional distress
was modest at best. 1I1I The parody, according to his testimony, left him on
the verge of tears, generated an urge to attack Flynt physically, and
caused deep and long-lasting anger. lie The only other evidence cited by
the court of appeals was the testimony of an associate that the evangel
ist's enthusiasm and optimism suffered to such an extent that Falwell had
not been able to concentrate on the extensive administrative details of his
ministry.97 This evidence falls far short of demonstrating "severe and
debilitating emotional injury ... of grave intensity and duration.""
Moreover, as disturbed and distracted as Falwell may have been, he did
manage to disseminate approximately 1.3 million fundraising letters over
his signature not long after the parody first appeared. ee
95. Under Virginia law, Falwell had to show that: (1) Flynt had acted intentionally or
recklessly; (2) this conduct offended generally accepted standards of m~rality and decency;
(3) the conduct caused Falwell's emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was se
vere. [d. at 1275 n.4. The Fourth Circuit ruled that Flynt's own deposition-in which he
characterized Falwell as a "glutton," a "liar," and a "hypocrite," and expressed his wish to
"assassinate" Falwell's integrity, id. at 1273-would, if accepted as credible by the jury,
establish the first element, intentional or reckless conduct. The language of the parody, cou
pled with Flynt's republication of the piece after Falwell had filed suit, constituted the out
rageousness required by the second element. [d. at 1276.
96. The court of appeals quoted the following portion of Falwell's testimony concerning
his reaction to the parody:
A. I think I have never been as angry as I was at that moment . . . . My anger
became a more rational and deep hurt. I somehow felt that in all of my life I had
never believed that human beings could do something like this. I really felt like
weeping. I am not a deeply emotional person; I don't show it. I think I felt like
weeping.
Q. How long did this sense of anger last?
A. To this present moment.
Q. You say that it almost brought you to tears. In your whole life, Mr. Falwell,
had you ever had a personal experience of such intensity that could compare with
the feeling that you had when you saw this ad?
A. Never had. Since I have been a Christian I don't think I have ever intention
ally hurt anybody. I am sure I have hurt people but not with intent. I certainly
have never physically attacked anyone in my life. I really think that at that mo
ment if Larry Flynt had been nearby I might have physically reacted.
[d. at 1276.
97. [d. at 1277.
98. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 87, at 615.
99. Nearly 780,000 of those letters contained reproductions of the offending advertising
parody. These letters generated approximately $717,000 in donations. In addition, Falwell
displayed the parody on his television broadcasts, thereby eliciting an undetermined amount
in further contributions. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1150
(9th Cir. 1986).
The magazine then unsuccessfully filed suit asserting that the unauthorized reproduction
of the parody for fundraising purposes infringed its copyright. The defendants prevailed on
grounds of fair use, although the majority of a divided appellate panel found this to be a
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Even if a less rigorous criterion of mental disturbance were required,lOo
the weakness of the evidence of emotional distress, coupled with the ob
scure connection between that distress and the amount of the judgment,
suggests that the verdict was designed to punish an unpopular speaker for
an extraordinarily tasteless publication rather than to compensate a vic
tim of serious psychic harm. That suggestion lends support to those who
believe that principled adjudication of emotional-distress claims is impos
sible,lol which in turn suggests that the Falwell ruling was also legally
incorrect. If cases of this sort are resolved simply on the basis of "situa
tional justice,"102 the first amendment interest in free expression is likely
to be forgotten. 103 The uncertainty generated by such ad hoc balancing
almost surely will deter some protected speech, a result plainly incompat
ible with the Supreme Court rulings discussed earlier.
The constitutional arguments in Falwell drew heavily upon defamation
jurisprudence. On this score, Flynt urged primarily that Falwell, as a pub
lic figure, had to satisfy the New York Times actual-malice standard in
order to prevail on his emotional-distress count. The court of appeals re
jected this proposition while simultaneously purporting to require Falwell
to prove that Flynt had acted with a high degree of fault. This reasoning
recognized the danger that plaintiffs otherwise could circumvent the pro
tections for the press that New York Times had established. 104 The court
added, however, that the first element of Falwell's emotional-distress
claim-intentional or reckless conduct-was "precisely the level of fault
that New York Times requires in an action for defamation. " I 06 Even if
the court's analysis of culpability confounded Flynt's personal animosity
toward Falwell with his fault in publishing the parody-a point which is
not altogether clear from a careful reading of the opinion l06-it is appar

close case. See id. at 1151-56. The merits of this decision are beyond the scope of this Arti 
cle. But see id. at 1157-59 (Poole, J., dissenting) (rejecting the fair-use defense).
100. The American Law Institute defines severe emotional distress as that which is "so
severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it," and emphasizes "[t]he
intensity and the duration of the distress" as factors relevant to a find ing of severity. RE
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1963).
101. See , e.g., Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Even
handedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 75 (1982).
102. [d.
103. See , e.g. , Nimmer, supra note 49, at 939-41.
104. 797 F.2d at 1274.
105. [d . at 1275. In refusing to go further and require a showing of actual malice, the
court reasoned that such a requirement would improperly add a new element to the emo
tional-distress tort. [d. Yet New York Times itself effectively added that element to com
mon law defamation actions. See Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1047, 728
P.2d 1177, 1186, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542, 551 (1986).
106. The extensive quotations from Flynt's deposition demonstrating his undisguised

856

MERCER LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

ent that Flynt knew that the statements in the parody were not true.
Therefore, the evangelist probably could have established actual malice in
this case. 107 It seems somewhat curious, then, that Flynt placed so much
weight upon this contention. 108
A more promising line of attack would have emphasized Falwell's sta
tus as a prominent public personage deeply involved in the debate over
important political and moral issues, and the relationship between his
claims for libel and for emotional distress. As a significant participant in
public affairs, Falwell in effect assumed the risk that he would become
the target of "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at
tacks."IOS To the extent that such attacks impugn his reputation, he may
sue for defamation; to the extent that they portray him to the public in
an inaccurate and highly offensive fashion, he may seek relief for false
light invasion of privacy. In this instance, the evangelist brought a libel
suit.l1O He lost. In effect, the jury determined that he had suffered no
harm to his good name from Flynt's obnoxious satire. Had the court ruled
in his favor, Falwell could have collected damages for his emotional dis
tress. But to allow him to recover for that distress alone, unaccompanied
by reputational injury, would, for practical purposes, outlaw "a staggering
array of political statements."111 Many political criticisms, including al
most all parody and satire, are intended to make their targets feel uncom
fortable. l1I Indeed, any system committed to "uninhibited, robust, and
hatred for Falwell suggest a focus upon common law as opposed to New York Times actual
malice. See 797 F.2d at 1273. On the other hand, the court focused upon the question of
fault rather than ill will in explaining the meaning of actual malice in an action for inten
tional infliction of emotional distress. [d. at 1275.
107. Under this approach, authors of fiction generally find themselves in a more vulnera
ble legal position than do authors of nonfiction since the former, by definition, write works
that they know or intend to be false. See generally R. SMOLLA, supra note 24, at 138-59;
Smolla, supra note 25, at 43-47,86-89; Symposium, Defamation in Fiction, 51 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 223 (1985).
108. Flynt also argued that the parody was constitutionally protected as a statement of
opinion. The court rejected the fact-opinion distinction as irrelevant in an emotional-dis
tress case. 797 F.2d at 1275-76.
109. New York Times, 376 U_S. at 270; see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
708 (1969) (noting that language of political debate may be "vituperative, abusive, and inel
act"); accord Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45 (explaining that public officials and public figures
must establish actual malice in order to prevail in defamation actions because they, unlike
private figures, have "invite[d] attention and comment" as a "necessary consequence[] of
[their] involvement in public affairs").
110. Falwell did not assert a claim for false-light invasion of privacy. Precisely why he
did not do so is unclear. A Lexis search of all reported Virginia decisions from 1925 to the
present (conducted February 2, 1987) shows that the state appellate courts have never COD
sidered a case involving a common law claim for invasion of privacy.
111. 805 F.2d at 488 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
112. [d. at 487.
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wide-open" debate l13 cannot accord much weight to the interest of public
officials and public figures in emotional tranquility. 114
This suggests that the proper constitutional response to Falwell should
have been some variant of President Truman's famous epigram, "If you
can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen." Because criticism that
neither defames nor invades the privacy of political figures is part of the
game, courts should not allow them to recover damages for the hurt feel
ings that follow from such criticism.
This observation implies a more general conclusion about the relation
ship between claims for libel and privacy on the one hand, and those for
intentional infliction of emotional distress on the other. The emotional
distress tort was recognized in order to afford relief to those who, like the
victim of an overbearing bill collector who repeatedly harasses a debtor
on the telephone, otherwise would have had no remedy.m This new cause
of action protects the interest in freedom from mental disturbance. As
noted earlier, however, both defamation and invasion of privacy actions
permit recovery for psychic harm. Although emotional distress differs in
certain respects from the other theories,1l8 there is no reason to allow
plaintiffs-whether public officials, public figures, or private figures-who
cannot or will not vindicate their interests through libel or privacy suits
to circumvent whatever constitutional restrictions apply to such litigation
by denominating their grievances as claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.1l7
113. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
114. See 805 F.2d at 486-89 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc);
Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe
Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1780-81 (1985).
Indeed, the British, who have not adopted fault-based standards in defamation litigation,
seem to thrive on acerbic and highly personal political criticism. For example, John Wilkes,
in response to the Earl of Sandwich's suggestion that he would die on the gallows or of a
loathesome disease, reputedly answered that the cause of his death would depend upon
whether he embraced his critic's principles or his mistress. Two centuries later, while serv
ing in Sir Harold Wilson's cabinet, Lord George-Brown responded to a parliamentary in
quiry concerning termite infestation by assuring his questioner that he was always on the
alert for boring pests, wherever they may occur.
Harsh and even vicious criticism once was much more common in American politics than
is true today, but the targets of those barbs manage to survive without resort to judicial
remedies. See, e.g., 805 F.2d at 487 (Wilkinson, J ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc); Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970
SUP. CT. REV. 109, 112, 150; Note, supra, at 1780 n.155, 1781.
115. Pedrick, Intentional Infliction: Should Section 46 Be Revised?, 13 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 1, 21 (1985). The example in the text is drawn from Fountain v. World Fin. Corp., 144
Ga. App. 10, 12-14, 240 S.E.2d 558, 559-60 (1977).
116. See Intentional Infliction, supra note 88, at 350-55.
117. Id. at 359-60; Pedrick, supra note 115, at 21; cf. Hart v. E.P. Dutton & Co., 197
Misc. 274, 281-82, 93 N.Y.S.2d 871, 878-79 (Sup. Ct.) (plaintiff may not avoid statute of
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In the end, while the outcome in Falwell raises disturbing questions,
the unusual unattractiveness of the defendant and the special tasteless
ness of the statement in question may help to explain the result. At least
the court accorded some, albeit not enough, weight to the constitutional
issues at stake. A number of other judicial opinions ignore those issues
altogether in addressing claims of intentional infliction of emotional dis
tress. 1lI Nevertheless, until we develop "a sufficiently strong and general
view of the first amendment,"lle and so long as inner peace remains a
preeminent cultural value, the press must anticipate further litigation
under this rubric.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The unsettled state of libel law reflects a deeper ambiguity in our feel
ings about the press. The media playa central role in constraining abuses
of authority, yet experience has taught us to distrust unchecked accumu
lations of power. Defamation law embodies our uneasiness with the no
tion that the press itself may not be called to account. If the current rules
seem unsatisfactory, we can change them to make it more difficult, if not
impossible, for plaintiffs to recover. Achieving that goal, however, will not
insulate the press from other kinds of legal claims, because it will not
resolve the underlying ambiguity.

limitations for libel by recharacterizing action as one for disgorgement of profits derived
from allegedly defamatory book), aff'd mem., 277 A.D. 935, 98 N.Y.S.2d 773, appeal denied,
277 A.D. 962, 99 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1949). For the same reasons that defamation standards
should apply to privacy actions where both theories are alleged, this conclusion applies with
special force to cases in which allegations of emotional distress are joined with those for libel
or invasion of privacy. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 214·15, 638 P.2d 423, 426-27 (Ct. App.
1981); Woodruff v. Miller, 64 N.C. App. 364, 366-67, 307 S.E.2d 176, 177-78 (1983); but see
Duhamel v. Star, 133 Ariz. 558,561,653 P.2d 15, 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Swenson-Davis v.
Martel, 135 Mich. App. 632, 639, 354 N.W.2d 288, 292 (1984) (Kelly, J., concurring).
119. Van Alstyne, supra note 47, at 817.

